Location: United Nations, New York Delivered on: 5 March 2026 (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered) Colleagues, as has been said already, competition for natural resources has long been a driver of conflict. And yet, lasting economic growth and prosperity requires expansion of supply and a successful transition to sustainable sources of clean and renewable energy. Critical minerals are central to the global energy transition, economic resilience, and modern technology. I will make three further points. First, as supply chains for critical minerals become more concentrated, competition for these resources is driving geopolitical tension and creating exposure to coercion and disruption. Global demand is rising rapidly. Meeting this demand has the potential to reshape economies, but also requires responsible management of risks. Minerals-driven growth is not automatically stabilising. And in fragile contexts, mineral revenues can finance armed groups and military actors, deepen corruption, and undermine trust in institutions. And Ms DiCarlo highlighted some of the issues that arise, for example, in the Great Lakes region. And yet when done well, critical minerals development can, and should be, responsible and sustainable, supporting growth, jobs, and environmental protection in producing countries. Second, conflict-sensitive investment in critical minerals is essential. This means understanding conflict dynamics, maintaining dialogue with communities and, where appropriate, formalising artisanal mining. Any shift to industrial mining must ensure communities see the benefits through jobs, energy access, and economic opportunity. Good governance is also an essential element. Mineral development must respect national ownership, ensure transparent contracts, and fair taxation, and apply high environmental, social, and governance standards. Benefit‑sharing must be clear and tangible. Third, partnerships are key to meeting global demand in a responsible, sustainable way. The United Kingdom is committed to a partnerships-based approach to promoting responsible, diversified supply chains. We are proud to be helping international partners leverage their mineral resources for inclusive growth. For example, the Vale Base Metals refinery in Wales plays a critical role within a globally integrated network, processing nickel that originates from Indonesia and Canada, and undergoes intermediary processing in Japan or Canada before being imported to the UK for final processing. Partnerships with the private sector are also essential for mobilising capital at scale to unlock responsible investment in critical minerals. Coordination across sovereign funds, export credits, and private finance can help manage risk and ensure that today’s supply solutions do not become tomorrow’s conflict drivers. The United Kingdom stands ready to work with partners to ensure critical minerals are a source of stability and not insecurity.

Hundreds of thousands of households will benefit from lower water bills after the Government today (Fri March 6th) announced a major reform of WaterSure. Low-income households who use high amounts of water can qualify to have their bills capped. They must have a water meter and either a specific medical condition or three or more children living at home. More than a quarter of a million households (260,000) are already benefiting from the scheme, saving an average of £325 each – over a third of their typical bill. But changes set out today will expand the eligibility criteria to include disability benefits – meaning a further 53,000 low-income households will see significant savings. The reforms will also alter the way the price cap is determined, with most of the existing recipients seeing further savings of up to £100. Together the changes - the first since the scheme was introduced in 1999 – will mean around 300,000 households will see substantial help with their bills via WaterSure. Water Minister Emma Hardy said: Vulnerable households are particularly affected by cost-of-living pressures, including water bills. Reforming WaterSure will make a meaningful difference to hundreds of thousands of families who need support the most. These steps build on our Water White Paper that champions customers, protects the environment, restores public trust and works to secure a water system fit for the future. The WaterSure changes include: More people with disabilities will qualify. Those receiving disability benefits will now be eligible if their household income is below £25,745 per year. Bill caps will be fairer. Bills will be capped at the lowest average reading, helping those currently paying more People living alone will get extra help. Their bills will be capped at the average bill for a one-person household. Less red tape. People will no longer need to pay for a doctor’s note to apply, making it quicker, cheaper, and easier to get help. These moves build on recent announcements in the Water White Paper that champion consumer savings, including an accelerated smart meter rollout to millions of homes to help people save money on their bills. In addition, the introduction of mandatory water efficiency labelling on appliances - such as washing machines, dishwashers and showers - can save households around £125million in total on bills over the next decade. The changes to WaterSure follow other Government reforms that will deliver more security, opportunity, and respect for every family. The Child Poverty Strategy will lift around 550,000 children out of poverty by 2030 – the biggest reduction in a single parliament since records began. Families can also benefit from wider support announced at the budget, including £150 off energy bills, increasing the living wage by £900 a year and the removal of the two-child limit. Mike Keil, Chief Executive of the Consumer Council for Water (CCW), said: We’re delighted the UK Government is taking forward the majority of the changes CCW recommended as part of our review of the WaterSure scheme. These improvements will bring peace of mind to tens of thousands more customers whose circumstances mean they have no choice but to use a significant amount of water for essential needs. Many households are grappling with rising water bills, and these reforms will help relieve some of that pressure through extending support to more of the most vulnerable customers and also increasing the value of that financial assistance, in many cases. James Taylor, Director of Strategy at disability equality charity Scope said: Life costs more if you are disabled, and it’s very good news that more disabled families will qualify for discounted water bills. Water bills for some disabled families can be eye‑wateringly high. Disabled families often have no alternative but to wash themselves and their clothes more frequently, or to use large amounts of water for medical procedures at home. Grace Brownfield, Head of Influencing and Communications at Money Advice Trust, the charity which runs National Debtline, said: People with disabilities or long‑term health conditions can face particularly high essential costs, including for water, which can leave them more exposed to debt. Strengthening WaterSure is therefore a welcome step that will help more households who rely on higher water use for medical reasons. At National Debtline, 1 in 5 of people we helped last year were already behind on their water bills, so it’s vital that support continues to be improved for those who need it most – including people who may still fall outside this scheme. NOTE TO EDITORS: CURRENT WATERSURE ELIGIBILITY: Customers must be on a water meter (or awaiting one). Those who cannot have a meter fitted must be paying an assessed charge. Customers must be a high water use because either They have three or more children under the age of 19 living at home. Or They have a medical condition, such as Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, weeping skin diseases, incontinence, desquamation (flaky skin disease) or renal failure requiring home dialysis. Medical evidence must be provided. Someone in the household must also be on at least one of the following benefits to qualify: Universal Credit, Pension Credit, Income Support, Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income-based Employment and Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit or Working Tax Credit. Applications should be made annually to the water supplier. WATERSURE ELIGIBILITY CHANGES: The changes will, for the first time, bring Disability Living Allowance, Attendance Allowance, or Personal Independence Payments (PIP) into the legislative list of qualifying benefits. People on the above benefits must still be a high-water user for a medical reason. The change will also see a maximum household income of £25,745 in line with the average household in receipt of Universal Credit. These changes will bring 53,000 extra households into the scheme. The changes also remove the need to provide a medical note to prove a medical condition. Water companies have agreed to implement this voluntarily. The changes follow a consultation that ran from July to September and saw 63 responses. WATERSURE CAP CHANGES: WaterSure users currently have their bills capped at the company’s average bill amount, meaning those with low incomes or higher essential use are not penalised. However, there are currently discrepancies between how this average bill is calculated. Some companies will use the average value of everyone’s water bill while others will only use metered readings (which are often lower and more accurate). Average bills also do not reflect the size of the household. The reforms will ensure companies use the lowest possible average bill as the cap for WaterSure. This could be the overall average or the metered average – whatever is lower. Likewise, the cap will be adjusted so a single household only pays for the average volume used by one person. An estimated 53,000 single households will save an additional £100. In addition, around 130,000 households with more than one occupant will save an additional average of £26 a year. WATER BILLS: WaterSure users have higher water use because of medical conditions or 3+ children in the home. Their average bill before WaterSure is around £890. Average water bills for 25/26 rose by 26% to £603 per household. Average water bills for 26/27 are forecast to rise by 5% to £639. WaterSure users have their bills capped and in 24/25, the average reduction was £325. In 2024/25 (the latest year data is available) some 260,000 households received a WaterSure discount. Some 230,000 were in England and 30,000 were in Wales. Changes to WaterSure will be mandatory in England and voluntary in Wales. The reforms, which are set to come into force in early 2027, will be funded by an additional £1.14 onto the bills of other water customers.

Days after the Supreme Court invalidated President Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose broad tariffs, Brookings convened experts—Patrick Childress, partner at Holland and Knight; Elena Patel, senior fellow and co-director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center; Emily Blanchard, professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; and Mira Rapp-Hooper, Brookings visiting senior fellow and senior advisor, The Asia Group—to assess the legal, fiscal, economic, and strategic consequences. This analysis reflects on what the ruling reveals about U.S. fiscal exposure, the instruments now carrying trade policy, and the limits of tariffs in a deeply integrated global economy. The legal vehicle changed. The strategy did not. The Supreme Court’s decision removed IEEPA as an open-ended authority for adjusting tariffs, pushing the administration back onto statutes with defined procedural constraints. It did not alter the administration’s reliance on tariffs as a central policy instrument. The statutory authority changed—the underlying approach did not. The leverage derived from the credible threat of future tariff escalation remains intact. Within hours of the decision, the president announced a two-stage plan to maintain the tariff regime under different statutory authorities: invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose temporary tariffs of up to 15% for 150 days, while launching a series of investigations under Section 301 of the same statute that could support more sustained tariff actions. If those investigations result in formal findings, Section 301 allows tariffs to be reimposed with greater flexibility—adjusted over time, applied selectively by country, and grounded in a statutory framework that has previously withstood judicial scrutiny. As Childress observed during the recent Brookings event, that flexibility is precisely what the administration values. Shifting tariff policy from emergency authority to Section 301 does not alter the administration’s strategy. It does, however, restore structure. Section 301 requires investigations, public notice and comment, consultation with trading partners, and formal findings—procedural steps largely absent under IEEPA. That process creates an opportunity for affected firms, workers, and other stakeholders to shape the record in ways that were largely unavailable under IEEPA. Tariffs persist—and markets and allies are adjusting The administration’s rapid pivot to alternative authorities clarified expectations. The critical development was not the invalidation of IEEPA itself but the confirmation that tariffs would remain a continuing feature of U.S. policy. Despite the Court’s ruling, the administration’s use of tariffs persists; it did not use the occasion of the ruling to retreat from them. On the Brookings panel, Blanchard emphasized the realization that tariffs were likely to endure may be more consequential than the Court’s ruling itself. Firms that delayed pricing or sourcing adjustments pending the decision now face a different calculation. Blanchard suggested that many importers had been holding back on price pass-through while waiting to see whether the tariffs would survive judicial review. If expectations shift toward persistence, firms are more likely to pass costs on to consumers and adjust sourcing decisions accordingly. At the same time, the president retains substantial flexibility in how tariffs can be deployed—raised, lowered, or differentiated across partners. As Blanchard observed, strategic ambiguity in tariff negotiations may be useful in bilateral dealmaking, but it is “kryptonite for firms” trying to plan in a globally integrated production system. For U.S. trading partners, the shift away from emergency authority changes the process, not the trajectory. As Rapp-Hooper noted, allies were unsettled by the sweep of the 2025 tariffs, but they recognize the statutory paths now being used. Many are treating the ruling as a procedural recalibration rather than a strategic reversal, anticipating changes in degree rather than a return to the pre-2016 trade framework. As she noted, governments are making “no sudden movements.” Asian allies that negotiated tariff arrangements with the administration in response to IEEPA tariffs are now focused on preserving stability rather than reopening settled terms. Countries without firm agreements, such as India, may defer negotiations in hopes of securing more favorable terms under the evolving authorities. The throughline is strategic caution. Trade statutes as tax policy At the scale reached in 2025, tariffs function as tax policy. Roughly $130 billion has already been collected under the IEEPA tariffs, and the Congressional Budget Office projected that maintaining the tariff increases over the standard ten-year budget window would generate roughly $3 trillion in revenue—an amount large enough to offset a substantial portion of the federal revenue loss from last summer’s tax bill. As Patel emphasized on the Brookings panel, the primary statutory tools now carrying U.S. tariff policy—including Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and the national security-related authority in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962—are delegations of Congress’s authority to tax and regulate trade, enacted decades ago for episodic use. When used at this scale, tariffs operate in territory traditionally reserved for tax legislation. Congress retains the authority to clarify, narrow, or reclaim those delegations. The fiscal implications are immediate. The IEEPA ruling suggests not only that future collections under that authority are unavailable but that past collections may ultimately have to be refunded. To the extent tariff levels cannot be sustained—or past collections must be repaid—the revenue outlook would necessarily change. Repaying sums of this magnitude would create a substantial fiscal hole and raise difficult questions about refund mechanics and who would ultimately bear—or benefit from—the reversal. At this scale, tariff litigation is not a technical trade dispute; it is a budgetary event. The limits of tariffs in a value-chain economy The deeper question is not which statute replaces IEEPA—it is what tariffs are being asked to do. Over the past decade, across administrations, tariff increases have expanded well beyond targeted trade remedies. They are used as a catch-all instrument for manufacturing revival, leverage in foreign policy, and now revenue generation. The tension is clearest between revenue and reshoring. If tariffs succeed in reducing imports and reshoring manufacturing to the U.S., the revenue base from tariffs necessarily shrinks. If tariffs are relied upon as a meaningful source of federal revenue, imports must persist at significant levels. The two objectives cannot be pursued simultaneously: Tariffs cannot both reduce import dependence and depend on imports for revenue. Beyond the revenue question, tariffs are a blunt tool for rebuilding manufacturing capacity in a globally integrated economy. U.S. manufacturers rely heavily on imported intermediates—components and raw materials from trading partners around the world. Most of these transactions reflect the normal functioning of modern value chains rather than the presence of strategic vulnerability through adversarial dependence. Broad border tariffs therefore tend to raise costs for domestic producers embedded in global value chains more reliably than they exert sustained pressure on foreign suppliers. Rather than enhancing competitiveness, they risk eroding it. If the primary goal is to build sectoral capacity, more direct industrial policy tools may be better aligned with that goal. Targeted subsidies, tax credits, procurement policies, workforce development, and regulatory design can be calibrated to specific production outcomes in ways tariffs cannot. As Patel cautioned during the panel, industrial policy itself is not simple: It can be designed well or poorly, and it raises difficult questions about delivery mechanisms and the risks of picking winners. But, as Blanchard emphasized, placing those decisions in Congress’s hands forces a transparent reckoning with costs, tradeoffs, and priorities. Tariffs, by contrast, can create the illusion of costlessness because they do not appear as line items in a federal budget, even though their costs are borne domestically. Panelists agreed that a change in administration is unlikely to resolve this debate. Concerns about supply chain vulnerability and industrial resilience are widely shared across the political spectrum. But if the objective is to reduce reliance on strategic adversaries, the more coherent strategy may lie in coordinated action with allies. As Rapp-Hooper suggested, high tariffs are politically difficult to unwind, but they have also created a substantial stock of negotiating leverage. Rather than allowing that leverage to calcify, it could be converted into a supply chain initiative with trusted allies, potentially transforming this administration’s trade framework agreements into vehicles for resilience, security, and economic gain. Designing economic statecraft for the world we have Trade authorities enacted in the 1960s and 1970s for episodic use now anchor not only trade policy, but elements of fiscal and industrial policy. That evolution occurred through the cumulative use of existing authorities to pursue objectives that might otherwise have required new legislation. It did not follow from a deliberate reassessment of how trade, fiscal, and industrial policy should interact in an era of technological change and geopolitical competition. Whatever one thinks of the underlying goals, institutional design has lagged policy ambition even as it has failed to constrain it. Over the past decade, presidents of both parties have insisted that the U.S. needs more domestic manufacturing capacity and more manufacturing employment. Fiscal pressures, supply chain vulnerabilities, and geoeconomic competition are real. The turn toward economic statecraft is neither accidental nor illegitimate. But it demands clarity about which instruments are suited to which goals. Revenue generation belongs properly to tax legislation. Sectoral capacity and industrial development are often more directly addressed through appropriations, targeted subsidies, procurement policy, workforce development, and regulatory design. Supply chain resilience and strategic competition may require coordinated action with allies as much as unilateral trade measures. Trade policy is one instrument within that broader toolkit. When it becomes the primary vehicle for pursuing all of these aims—because it is available, delegated, and comparatively easier to deploy—strain follows. That strain appears in multiple forms: administrative burden, litigation risk, volatility for firms and trading partners, and policy effects that are less precise than intended. Using a blunt border instrument to pursue complex industrial and fiscal objectives generates consequences that extend beyond those objectives. Meanwhile, U.S. allies are adjusting—economically and strategically. Many are deepening economic ties with one another while recalibrating to a more protectionist and less predictable United States. Few are retaliating loudly; few are waiting for Washington to resolve its internal debate. There is little sign of a rally to reform the multilateral system to accommodate U.S. concerns. Instead, partners are diversifying partnerships, reducing exposure to U.S. volatility, and hedging against uncertainty. This quiet reshuffling of economic relationships may outlast any single administration. The Court narrowed one statutory authority. It did not resolve how the United States intends to design economic statecraft for a deeply integrated global economy. That requires clarity of purpose, alignment between instruments and objectives, and institutional guardrails commensurate with the scale of the ambitions now being pursued.

To be American is to embrace the narratives and experiences of freedom and unfreedom. It is to know there were enslaved people and those who enslaved them. It is to learn that some could vote and others could not. And it is to learn that states’ boundaries were formed by removing their indigenous inhabitants. These are the realities of American history, and ignoring them means denying mechanisms that might transfigure our country into a more perfect union. The act of suppressing information, knowledge, and data about Americans dishonors the past and those who fought for equality and justice. Acts of suppression often fuel counterrevolutions that seek to reverse social, racial, economic, and political progress for unrepresented groups. Recent examples include the federal government’s removal of an exhibit on the realities of slavery in America from the President’s House in Philadelphia. There have also been thousands of attempts since 2020 to ban books that focus on racial, ethnic, LGBTQ+, and religious minority communities from public libraries and schools. To preserve the legacy, vision, and transformative influence of these communities in constructing American democracy, then and now, scholars at the Race, Prosperity, and Inclusion Initiative (RPII) are launching a series titled “Uprooted: Rediscovering American History.“ Uprooted examines the histories and contributions of marginalized groups that have shaped our nation. This series provides evidence-based analysis and concrete policy recommendations to reinforce civil rights, address economic inequality, and promote mutual understanding in a landscape increasingly shaped by misinformation, partisan rhetoric, and political infighting. Our work highlights the voices, leadership, and impact of these groups, emphasizing their role in advancing policies that foster a more inclusive democracy. In doing so, we seek to prevent them from being forgotten, erased, or uprooted. Research consistently demonstrates that systemic disparities—embedded within institutions, policies, and social norms—have historically marginalized certain communities and perpetuated gaps in education, economic opportunity, health care, and the criminal justice system. These structures continue to guide decisions about access and opportunity, often in tension with the idealized narrative of a meritocratic society. Ongoing debates over resource distribution have heightened political tensions, strained civic cohesion, and contributed to regressive policy actions. Amid these challenges, communities have responded through various forms of activism, policy advocacy, and legislative changes. Examples include immigration policy, the Black Lives Matter movement, marriage equality, technology justice, and national health care access movements. Uprooted highlights innovative policies and community-led solutions to these problems. Drawing on social science research showing that fairness and strong civic networks drive economic prosperity and collective well-being, the series creates a platform for nuanced, evidence-based discussion of racial and economic injustice—and aims to catalyze action by bridging political divides, championing policy innovation, and inspiring civic engagement in the ongoing work of building a healthier democracy. Over the next year, Brookings scholars and external contributors will examine five key themes from both historical and modern perspectives. Migration and immigration: Across America, the demographic changes caused by the movement of people within and into the country have shaped cities, the workforce, culture, and public policies. These movement patterns impact the democratic process and have deep implications for housing, health care, and workforce development. Civic engagement and community power: At the heart of the American promise are free speech and collective action. Social movements have long embodied these values, giving individuals the autonomy to define their own freedom and the capacity to resist oppressive power, pursue equality, and promote practices that mature our democracy and create pathways for equitable access, resources, and the opportunity to thrive. Inclusion and cultural politics: Storytelling and art allow Americans to express their identities and political views, and in doing so, strengthen democratic participation. Preserving that democracy means documenting and centering the historical and modern-day perspectives of diverse communities to build a more inclusive future and uphold our shared democratic principles. Community health and well-being: Health and well-being are shaped by social networks, neighborhood environments, and opportunities for social mobility. Access to high-quality health care and robust public health prevention is essential, yet policy also determines the physical and social landscapes that either hinder or support healthy living. Technology and innovation: Technology can accelerate the spread of mis- and disinformation targeting people of color, while also enabling the extraction of data from vulnerable populations without regard for the human consequences. Addressing these harms requires human-centered policy, as well as leaders who understand the experiences of affected online communities. These efforts have the potential to mitigate online bias and labor force disruptions, helping to prevent wider wealth gaps when individuals and groups are excluded from mainstream technology conversations. The collective scope of Uprooted centers the voices of communities across America, revealing that the promise of the American dream is most equitably achieved when we move toward collective action that builds resilience. “Uprooted: Rediscovering American History” contributes bold and uplifting dialogue to the national debate on racial equity, shining a light on narratives and people that are lost but not forgotten. Uprooted’s first cycle of publications, focusing on migration and immigration, launches at the end of March 2026. See more from Uprooted

Each year, International Women’s Day invites us to reflect on progress while also confronting the challenges that continue to impede gender equality. This year’s theme—“Rights. Justice. Action.”—speaks to a daily reality for the majority of women and girls around the world: legal reforms and policy commitments often fail to transform their lived experiences. Despite improvements in global measures of legal equality between men and women, in nearly 70% of countries, women face greater barriers to accessing justice than men, a situation that worsens in the growing number of conflict-affected contexts. Girls and women continue to face increasing levels of gender-based violence, and women’s rights have been subject to the winds of political change as well as highly organized anti-gender movements in the U.S. and globally. In short, policy change on its own has not been enough. Across the world, systems meant to protect or advance gender equality are too often designed around the resilience of girls, women, and their communities rather than shared responsibility. They rely on individuals to make up for structural weaknesses, whether that be survivors seeking justice, girls navigating discriminatory norms, or community leaders and organizations filling institutional gaps. As our recent research with girls across eight countries has shown, improved outcomes—whether that be defined as well-being, thriving, or justice—require shifting from a narrow focus on individual agency to engaging girls, boys, families, educators, communities, governments, and funders to transform the systems around them. As we reflect on this year’s IWD theme, my colleagues, the Echidna Global Scholars working to promote gender equality in and through education in Uganda, Jamaica, India, and around the world, challenge us to focus on redesigning systems for justice. Advancing women’s rights and gender equality is about more than resilience. It requires intentional design and sustained commitment to transform norms, rebuild structures, distribute power, and ensure that hard-won rights translate into lasting and lived equality.

On March 3, 2025, Senior Fellow Mark Muro testified before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Manufacturing, and Competitiveness. Muro’s testimony stressed the importance of embracing the ability of artificial intelligence (AI) to expand human expertise, while addressing valid fears about its powers. Ultimately, he said, the goal must be to keep the technology pro-human and pro-community. There is currently a pervasive worry about AI’s potential negative consequences for workers and communities. Muro argued that Congress could help dispel some of these worries and bolster the current state of AI development by building a national AI adoption platform that would simultaneously drive technological growth and ensure workers are not left behind. In his written testimony, Muro stressed five key elements a platform like this should have: Research: Though the United States is the current leader in AI research and design, current growth rates indicate that other AI innovators such as China will make up a larger chunk of global AI investment by 2027. While U.S. government funding for AI research increased from 2024 to 2025, it did not double between 2019 and 2026, as the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence advocated for. Additionally, current AI research is heavily reliant on private sector funding. To ensure the U.S. maintains its lead in AI research and development, Congress should increase government funding for this research significantly, as well as expand investments for basic research and mechanisms that broaden access to essential AI resources. This could take the form of increased investment in universities or revitalization of the National Science Foundation (NSF)-led National AI Research Institutes program. Regional innovation clusters: This aspect of a national AI support platform would focus on promoting growth in up-and-coming regions. The national AI economy stands to benefit from federal investment in these “emerging AI clusters,” which could take the form of increased research and computational support from programs such as the National AI Research Institutes and the National AI Research Resource, or challenge grants similar to the NSF’s Regional Innovation Engines. Talent: The development of elite AI talent, as well as a broadly AI-ready workforce, is crucial to any national AI adoption platform. Visa reforms and a focus on AI literacy in higher education would bolster AI readiness across both the top scholar level and the wider workforce. Similarly, Congress could promote the creation of regional AI learning networks that would partner with employers to train employees in AI skills. Infrastructure: While programs such as the CHIPS and Science Act’s subsidies for the construction of semiconductor factories have begun to address infrastructure gaps in the AI economy, current data center development has heightened demand for computing resources and energy. To ensure supply matches demand, the federal government could create more clean energy generation sources and grid links, as well as facilitate more strategic data center development. Worker security: Worker security is a key part of any national platform for AI development to ensure workers are not left behind in the process of AI adoption. Recent Brookings analysis projects that many industries will face high levels of disruption from generative AI in coming years. This could endanger worker mobility and spike unemployment. One way to mitigate these potential negative impacts would be “active labor market policies” that retrain workers or provide them flexible benefits not tied to one employer. Another option could be temporary income support through a “Universal Basic Adjustment Benefit” also aimed at helping displaced workers transition to new positions. Innovative firms of all kinds—whether AI developers themselves, AI-adopting firms, or AI startups entering the space—are providing abundant grounds for excitement about AI’s potential, Muro wrote. Their entrepreneurship gives much cause for optimism. Yet sustaining that optimism requires sustaining those firms’ growth and Americans’ confidence in the future—and that means reinvesting in the fundamentals of American AI strength and vibrancy. To read Muro’s full testimony, click here. To watch the testimony video, click here.

Iraq finds itself caught in the crossfire of Israeli and American strikes against Iran. Unlike the Arab Gulf states, Iraq is the target of attacks from both sides, straining its ability to stay neutral and resist growing pressures from pro-Iranian paramilitary groups following Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s assassination. The longer this war continues and the more frequently Iraq is targeted, the greater the risk that Iraq will descend into chaos. Multiple armed groups within the country—including pro-Iranian Shia paramilitaries and Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups—can aggravate fault lines that might trigger civil conflict. Meanwhile, the regional war has disrupted oil exports and electricity imports, threatening to push an already strained population toward open unrest. Since October 2023, Iraq has defied the odds. Despite extraordinary external pressures and deep state fragilities, the Iraqi government has kept the country out of regional wars. Iraq’s political and religious leaders, including the powerful Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, have committed to protecting Iraq’s hard-earned stability. Iraq has long balanced between Washington and Tehran, but the coming weeks will test Iraq’s resolve and capability like never before. Failure risks igniting civil conflict—a devastating outcome for the United States, which has spent trillions of dollars and sacrificed thousands of troops over two decades to stabilize Iraq. Falling victim to both sides Iraq’s vulnerability is compounded by bad timing: the country is mid-transition, forming a new government while the old one operates in a weakened, interim capacity. A third of cabinet posts are now vacant, as their occupants have moved on to become members of the new parliament. As a result, important institutions like the Ministry of Defense are now led by the prime minister on an acting basis. Despite these constraints, the Iraqi government has attempted to deal firmly with pro-Iranian armed factions, limiting their direct engagement in the conflict. Authorities have also acted quickly to prevent pro-Iranian protesters, many of whom are members of these armed groups, from entering the Green Zone and attacking the American embassy within it. Iraqis are not just reacting to attacks on Iran; they are responding to attacks on their own soil. The United States has struck several Popular Mobilization Forces bases in Iraq, killing at least four paramilitary members. For its part, Iran has attacked the American presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, primarily targeting Erbil International Airport, the site of the last military base housing U.S. troops in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan is a sensitive territory, as it is also home to many Iranian-Kurdish opposition groups. However, like Iraq’s Shia, it would be a mistake to treat the Kurds as a monolithic group, whether regionally or within Iraqi Kurdistan itself. Iranian Kurds may be anticipating regime change in Tehran, but Iraqi Kurds may not be willing to sacrifice the political gains that they’ve achieved since 1991. Their role in the Syrian context is telling: they helped mediate between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Damascus but did not adopt the Syrian Kurdish cause as their own. Just last month in Dubai, the premier of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masrour Barzani, declared neutrality and his intention to stay out of the American-Iranian conflict. This stance will likely hold, even under American pressure to use Iraqi Kurdistan as a launchpad for a Kurdish insurgency inside Iran. Kurds, like many Iraqis, know that they are caught in a war they want no part in. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein—himself a Kurd—recently put it plainly: while Iraq is “not a party to the war … its geographic location makes it directly impacted by its repercussions and the associated military operations.” Iraqi Shias and their complicated relations with Iran Iraq’s Shia community—politicians, religious leaders, and ordinary citizens alike—has a complex relationship with Iran, one that defies the myth of the “Shia crescent.” Many Shia leaders met the news of Khamenei’s assassination with condolences and mourning, including the announcement of 3 days of public mourning. However, this was a political calculation meant to appease Iraq’s polarized Shia population, not a sincere expression of grief. For decades, Iraqi Shia have sharply disagreed over how to view the Islamic Republic: as an ally or a malign meddler in Iraqi affairs. Iraqi public opinion polling reinforces this picture. Iraqis generally share similar negative sentiments toward Iran and the United States, viewing them both as foreign interveners. By issuing broad statements of mourning while refusing to engage militarily, the Iraqi government is attempting to placate both sides at once. The pressure on Iraqi Shia leaders is perhaps best illustrated by the behavior of Muqtada al-Sadr—long seen as the most prominent check on Iranian influence among Iraq’s Shia. Al-Sadr was the first to release a condolence statement and announce three days of mourning for Khamenei, beating the Iraqi state to it. If al-Sadr is calibrating this carefully, the pressure on less independent figures is likely far greater. Making sense of Sistani’s statement Khamenei’s assassination has reshuffled the hierarchy of Shia religious authority worldwide, leaving Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf as its undisputed senior cleric. Unlike Khamenei, Sistani and Iraq’s Shia religious authorities do not subscribe to the theocratic political doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih—the principle that clerics should directly govern the state—that their clerical counterparts in Iran do. Sistani’s reaction to Khamenei’s assassination was measured: he released a short statement of condolence, recognizing Khamenei as a respected religious scholar and political leader while urging the Iranian people to maintain unity. He followed this with a longer statement condemning the aggression against Iran and calling on the international community to pursue a peaceful and just resolution to Iran’s nuclear program. Sistani’s restrained tone has unsettled parts of the broader Shia community, with some interpreting it as abandonment. But Sistani’s response should surprise no one, as the Iraqi Shia religious establishment has historically prioritized stability. Moreover, Sistani’s statements have always reflected his political realism—he works within the framework of nation-states and engages international actors where he believes they can make a difference. Sistani’s statements are a stabilizing force, effectively delegitimizing anyone or any group seeking to invoke religion to incite retaliatory violence. The value of Iraqi stability Maintaining Iraqi stability is not a costly endeavor for the United States, and Washington will find ample Iraqi political and religious leaders ready to partner on this goal. Last month, the United States worked directly with Iraqi authorities to transfer over 5,000 ISIS detainees (most of whom are not Iraqi) from eastern Syria to Iraq for prosecution and potential repatriation. This transfer succeeded because Iraq was both stable and a reliable partner in the war against ISIS. The United States must not take that stability for granted. The United States should avoid preemptively striking low-level targets in Iraq that would agitate existing fault lines and make it more difficult for political and religious leaders to maintain order and neutrality.

After stabilizing their macro indicators by the turn of the century, many African countries sought external financing for critical investments in infrastructure and technology that were necessary for growth and vital to the attainment of their development aspirations. Unfortunately, their access to global financial markets was stymied: At that time, only one African country, South Africa, had a sovereign credit rating.1 To address this, UNDP partnered with S&P in 2003 to support credit ratings for viable African countries. Since then, 34 African countries have been rated and 21 countries have raised $155 billion Eurobonds.2 The effects of access to global capital markets In the early 2000s, some observers were concerned that providing African countries with credit ratings would signal “market readiness.” They opined that access to global capital markets could result in excessive borrowing that would undo debt relief efforts under the IMF and World Bank’s HIPC and MDRI frameworks.3 Thus, in the present day one may ask: Has Africa’s access to more non-concessional lending via ratings precipitated or worsened Africa’s debt crises? First, it is important to note, as documented in previous Brookings research,4 that African countries need to borrow for a number of reasons. For instance, they do not earn enough from their exports and their capital investment needs exceed potential revenue streams (even when we assume zero corruption). Moreover, unlike in 2000 when 70% of the continent was categorized as low-income, thereby enabling them to access concessional development financing, in 2025, half of the continent is middle-income and must rely more heavily on commercial sources to finance its development.5 Additionally, aid flows to African countries have dipped in recent years, declining by 15% between 2020-23.6 Against this backdrop, credit ratings play a uniquely important role in determining Africa’s access to affordable financing. Unlike other regions that have multiple data points to assess risk, the dearth of relevant and reliable data in Africa means that credit ratings play an outsized role in determining risk perceptions.7 UNDP estimated that 16 African countries pay more in debt servicing costs than they should because credit ratings are lower than they could be. The total estimated resulting loss is over $74 billion,8 exacerbating Africa’s debt service stress. While credit ratings are not the only reason Africa’s borrowing costs are so high, there is no doubt that they play a central role as a benchmark signaling indicator. As of end October 2025, only three of the rated 34 African countries are rated as investment grade.9 Thus, borrowing for most of the continent attracts a premium (for the non-investment grade countries) or punitive rates (for the 38% of the continent that is unrated).10 Moreover, this elevated cost of borrowing is often misaligned with the region’s actual financial potential. For example, at 2.6%, default rates on infrastructure investments in Africa are among the lowest in the world.11 Costly financing is also causing a slowdown in Africa’s gross capital formation, which is far below the average of 33% for middle-income countries.12 Yet Africa must invest more if it is to grow. Investment delayed could be development denied. Pathways to improve Africa’s sovereign credit ratings Targeted and consistent efforts to improve credit ratings for African countries could be transformative and help Africa finance its development without being burdened with unsustainable debt. Such efforts could free up much-needed fiscal space by reducing borrowing costs and increase the size and quality of investment flows. Furthermore, the credit ratings process could help establish conditions for improved economic governance. However, getting this right requires concerted and coordinated efforts by the credit ratings agencies and African countries.

When the Trump administration first announced its “workforce optimization initiative” for the federal government in early 2025, Greater Washington’s economy entered into a state of limbo. For the District of Columbia and its neighboring Maryland and Virginia suburbs—a region colloquially known as the “DMV”—the federal government has long been the lifeblood of the regional economy and labor market, conservatively accounting for 9.7% of its employment base (reflecting only direct federal government civilian jobs, and excluding private sector jobs funded through federal contracting). When the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) announced the beginning of its federal workforce purge, the question was not whether the DMV economy would suffer the consequences, but how much it would suffer, and for how long. While some of the impacts of federal downsizing have been readily apparent in monthly data releases from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the design of DOGE’s strategy has previously made the scope of damage on the DMV region’s labor market difficult to quantify. While thousands of federal workers were terminated immediately, more than 150,000 others accepted offers for deferred resignation (also known as the “Fork in the Road”), which kept them on the federal payroll through the end of the fiscal year on September 30, 2025. These workers, while functionally jobless, were thus excluded from official job and unemployment counts in the first three quarters of 2025.

La gobernadora Kathy Hochul resaltó hoy la importancia de su plan para brindar cuidado infantil universal a niños menores de cinco años en todo el estado, destacando la conexión entre el cuidado infantil universal y asequible y un estado más asequible y próspero. La presidenta de Women in Need (Win), Christine Quinn, se reunió con la gobernadora Hochul para reunirse con familias sin hogar y hablar sobre la dificultad de encontrar opciones de cuidado infantil asequibles y cómo el cuidado infantil universal aliviaría una importante carga financiera para estas familias y otras en todo el estado.“Mi administración está totalmente enfocada en hacer la vida más asequible y habitable para los neoyorquinos, y es precisamente por eso que ampliar el acceso al cuidado infantil asequible ha sido una de mis principales prioridades desde el principio”, declaró la gobernadora Hochul. “Para demasiadas familias de todos los ámbitos, el enorme gasto en cuidado infantil representa una carga insuperable para sus presupuestos mensuales. El cuidado infantil universal brinda a todas las familias la oportunidad de prosperar, sin importar su nivel de ingresos o su vecindario. Todos los neoyorquinos merecen un techo, una comida en la mesa y un lugar seguro para criar a sus hijos”.Christine C. Quinn, Presidenta y Directora Ejecutiva de WIN, afirmó: “Lograr el cuidado infantil universal para nuestras familias más vulnerables es fundamental para resolver la crisis sin precedentes de personas sin hogar en Nueva York. Sabemos que los padres no pueden mantenerse a sí mismos ni a sus familias si no pueden ir a trabajar, y tampoco pueden hacerlo si no tienen acceso a un cuidado infantil seguro, confiable y asequible. Hoy en día, hay más niños durmiendo en los albergues para personas sin hogar de la ciudad de Nueva York que asientos en el Yankee Stadium, y 3600 niños duermen en los albergues de Win cada noche; eso es una tragedia. Publicamos este informe para exponer la devastadora realidad de que la falta de acceso al cuidado infantil es un factor clave de la inestabilidad habitacional para los padres que viven en albergues. Ningún padre debería tener que elegir entre cuidar a su hijo o ganarse la vida”.Existe una clara relación entre la inestabilidad económica y la falta de cuidado infantil accesible y asequible. Según datos publicados hoy por WIN, el 78 % de los encuestados —neoyorquinos que viven en centros de WIN, específicamente familias con niños— enfrentaron uno o más tipos de interrupción laboral debido a la dificultad para acceder al cuidado infantil. Esto incluye perder un empleo, rechazar un ascenso o reducir las horas de trabajo.Estos datos subrayan la importancia de la inversión sin precedentes de la Gobernadora para brindar cuidado infantil universal y asequible a niños menores de cinco años en todo el estado de Nueva York.A principios de esta semana, la Gobernadora Hochul se unió al Alcalde Mamdani para anunciar un gran paso en su plan para brindar cuidado infantil gratuito a niños de dos años en la Ciudad de Nueva York. Este logro histórico fue posible gracias a la histórica inversión de $1.2 mil millones de la Gobernadora para apoyar los esfuerzos de cuidado y educación temprana en la Ciudad de Nueva York, que incluye una asignación significativa de $73 millones para establecer las primeras 2,000 plazas de 2-K en la ciudad. Además del compromiso existente del Estado para fortalecer la infraestructura de 3K de la Ciudad para atender a todas las familias de la ciudad. Con el apoyo continuo del Estado, se espera que la inversión estatal en 2K aumente a $425 millones para el próximo año.El Presidente del Condado de Manhattan, Brad Holman-Sigal, declaró: “Agradezco a la gobernadora Hochul, al alcalde Mamdani y a Christine Quinn por poner de relieve la clara conexión entre el acceso al cuidado infantil y la falta de vivienda familiar. El informe de Win deja claro que cuando los padres no pueden encontrar o costear un cuidado infantil confiable, se vuelve mucho más difícil conservar un trabajo, mantener la estabilidad y sacar a sus familias del albergue. En Manhattan, donde el cuidado infantil puede costar entre $25,000 y $30,000 al año, estas presiones son especialmente severas. El liderazgo de la gobernadora Hochul y su compromiso de ampliar el acceso al cuidado infantil marcarán una diferencia real para las familias trabajadoras y ayudarán a más padres a conseguir la estabilidad que sus hijos merecen”.El plan estatal de la gobernadora también incluye:Acceso continuo a programas de asistencia para el cuidado infantil asequibles y de bajo costo:Bajo el liderazgo de la gobernadora Hochul, Nueva York ha más que duplicado la inversión en el Programa de Asistencia para el Cuidado Infantil (CCAP) del estado, que proporciona subsidios para ayudar a las familias de bajos ingresos a acceder al cuidado infantil. Al aumentar drásticamente la inversión estatal en el programa y ampliar su elegibilidad, este ahora apoya a 2.5 veces más niños (100,000 adicionales) que cuando la gobernadora Hochul asumió el cargo. El número de niños atendidos ha aumentado casi un 25% tan solo en el último año. La mayoría de las familias de los 170,000 niños atendidos por el programa no pagan más de $15 por semana por cuidado infantil.Este año, la gobernadora Hochul continuará incrementando la inversión estatal en subsidios para el cuidado infantil para quienes más lo necesitan, con un aumento de $1,200 millones, lo que eleva el total disponible para subsidios a más de $3,000 millones. Esto representa más de 3.5 veces los $832 millones otorgados antes de que la gobernadora asumiera el cargo y un aumento de casi el 40% con respecto a lo dispuesto en el Presupuesto Aprobado para el año fiscal 2026.Logrando un Pre-K verdaderamente universalSi bien en algunas zonas de Nueva York los niños de cuatro años tienen acceso al Pre-K desde hace mucho tiempo, hay docenas de distritos escolares que aún no lo han hecho posible. La gobernadora Hochul está brindando apoyo adicional para garantizar un Pre-K verdaderamente universal para todos los niños de cuatro años del estado para el inicio del año escolar 2028-2029.El estado no solo financiará cupos adicionales para lograr la universalidad, sino que también aumentará la financiación de los cupos existentes, elevándolos hasta el monto mayor entre $10,000 o la ayuda básica actual seleccionada por el distrito escolar correspondiente por alumno, para que los distritos cuenten con lo necesario para brindar un Pre-K de alta calidad. Esta combinación refleja un compromiso de aproximadamente 500 millones de dólares y garantizará que todos los niños del estado de Nueva York ingresen al kínder listos para aprender.Lanzamiento de Nuevos Programas Piloto Innovadores con Condados de Todo el EstadoEn 2026, la Gobernadora Hochul lanzó un nuevo programa piloto estatal en colaboración con los condados de Dutchess, Monroe y Broome para ayudar a los condados a ofrecer más opciones de cuidado infantil en sus comunidades. Este programa piloto incluye un total de $60 millones en fondos estatales, además de nuevas inversiones de cada uno de los tres condados. Estas inversiones ayudarán a estos condados a ampliar el acceso al cuidado infantil, con un enfoque especial en la atención a niños de 0 a 3 años mediante cuidado de día completo durante todo el año para miles de familias en estas comunidades, independientemente de sus ingresos.Oficina de Cuidado Infantil y Educación TempranaUna nueva Oficina de Cuidado Infantil y Educación Temprana impulsará la implementación de un cuidado infantil universal de alta calidad en el estado de Nueva York. La Oficina supervisará y apoyará la implementación del Pre-K universal, la inversión continua en 3K, el lanzamiento de 2-Care y otras opciones de cuidado innovadoras, la expansión y mejora de los vales, y el apoyo continuo a la fuerza laboral.Apoyo a la fuerza laboral mediante la preparación de educadores de la primera infancial plan de la gobernadora Hochul para fortalecer la fuerza laboral de educación de la primera infancia de Nueva York incluye la ampliación de las becas existentes, la búsqueda de oportunidades para nuevas Becas Pell para la Fuerza Laboral y la orden a SUNY y CUNY de implementar diversas medidas para ampliar y optimizar los programas de educación de la primera infancia.La administración de la gobernadora Hochul se ha centrado en lograr un cuidado infantil asequible para todas las familias de Nueva York. En concreto, el estado ya ha logrado:Más del doble del número de niños atendidos por vales de cuidado infantil en tan solo cuatro años, con un aumento de casi el 25 % tan solo en los últimos 12 meses.Se han destinado más de 8600 millones de dólares al cuidado infantil, incluyendo más del doble de la financiación para subsidios.Ampliar drásticamente el número de familias elegibles, incrementando el ingreso máximo del 200 % del nivel federal de pobreza (aproximadamente $64,000 para una familia de cuatro integrantes) al máximo permitido por la ley federal: el 85 % del ingreso medio estatal (aproximadamente $114,000 para una familia de cuatro integrantes).Reducir el monto que pagan quienes reciben subsidios, limitando los costos a $15 semanales para la mayoría de las familias.Aumentar las tasas de reembolso para los proveedores en casi un 50 %, lo que ayudará a los proveedores a retener al personal y brindar atención de calidad a los niños en todo el estado.Apoyar la futura creación de miles de plazas de cuidado infantil y nuevos centros mediante más de $150 millones en fondos de capital. Comuníquese con la Oficina del Gobernador Ciudad de Nueva York Contact us by phone: Albany: (518) 474-8418New York City: (212) 681-4640 Contact us by email: [email protected]

北京地坛医院、北京航天总医院以及7家社区卫生服务中心近日新增电子胶片便民服务。患者完成X光、CT或核磁共振检查后，可通过手机端随时查看高清数字影像，告别携带胶片袋的不便。 在北京地坛医院，患者做完影像检查后，数据将自动上传至安全加密的云端。通过“京通”小程序或“北京地坛医院智慧服务平台”，即可随时查阅电子胶片及报告。该服务不仅省去了排队打印胶片的环节，医生在诊室电脑上也能直接调阅高清原图，异地转诊时还可通过一键生成的二维码分享影像，避免重复检查。 北京航天总医院的X线、CT、核磁等所有放射类检查项目的电子胶片及诊断报告均可免费查询，180天内的影像数据一键获取。患者如需补打实体胶片，可通过院内自助机挂“影像科胶片补打”0元号，经窗口办理后缴费领取。 此外，朝阳区来广营社区卫生服务中心、朝阳区麦子店社区卫生服务中心、朝阳区劲松社区卫生服务中心、朝阳区东湖社区卫生服务中心、海淀区香山社区卫生服务中心、海淀区北下关社区卫生服务中心、海淀区温泉镇社区卫生服务中心7家基层医疗机构也于近日上线了电子胶片服务。患者在上述机构进行影像检查后，可通过扫描报告单上的专属二维码或登录“京通”小程序，随时调阅数字影像资料。 相比传统胶片，电子胶片的图片更清晰、存储期限更长、保存质量更高，能快速检索查看、跨院区调阅。患者不需要花时间打印实体胶片，复诊转诊也不用携带大量胶片，既为患者带来便利，也提高了医生的诊断效率。此前，北京大学第三医院、北京友谊医院、北京中医医院等医院已上线电子胶片服务。 更多热点速报、权威资讯、深度分析尽在北京日报App 来源：北京日报客户端 （流程编辑：U073） 如遇作品内容、版权等问题，请在相关文章刊发之日起30日内与本网联系。版权侵权联系电话：010-85202353 扫描二维码下载手机客户端 分享到

惊蛰至，雪花飘。气象部门介绍，今天午后北京还有间歇性小雪或零星小雪，并伴有轻雾，傍晚前后降雪过程逐渐结束。雪后路面湿滑，部分路面（尤其是山区）有积雪结冰，道路结冰黄色预警中，大家出行注意安全，驾车减速慢行，保持车距。 雪后的气温较低，今天户外阴冷感明显，大家外出要做好防寒保暖措施。 而从明天开始，京城天气转晴，气温回升，周六日天气都不错，周日气温明显升高，午后暖意融融。 整体来看，下周京城天气以晴到多云的天气为主，气温呈波动上升趋势，白天最高气温在11℃至14℃，12日前后有小雨。 气象部门提醒，惊蛰节气，天气乍暖还寒，正值冬春交替时节，天气变化较大，请大家关注临近预报，提前做好防范。 更多热点速报、权威资讯、深度分析尽在北京日报App 来源：北京日报客户端 （流程编辑：U073） 如遇作品内容、版权等问题，请在相关文章刊发之日起30日内与本网联系。版权侵权联系电话：010-85202353 扫描二维码下载手机客户端 分享到